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I~I~IA:-;l'EL Kant, having posed the question of whether his
was an enlightened age, went on to give the prudent answer.
"No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment."1 Kant could
maintain his faith in enlightenment by turning his gaze from
what the present had accomplished to what the future prom-
ised. But in an age when, as Theodor Adorno observed, it is a
good deal easier to write a universal history leading from the
slingshot to the megaton bomb than it is to write one leading
from savagery to hu manitarianism, 2 proponents of en-
lightenment have had to be even more cautious than Kant.
What has passed for enlightenment must be placed under
suspicion. Thus Jurgen Habermas has suggested that a
"dialectical theory of progress. such as historical materialism
claims to be." had better keep its guard up:
... what presents itself as progress can soon show itself 10 be the
perpelUalion of what was presu mably overcome. Thus more
and more of the theorems of the cOllnLer-enlightenment have
been incorporated into the dialectic of enlightenment, more and
more e1emellls or the critique of progress have been assimilated
by the theoq of progress: all in order to formulate an idea of
pro!,{ress lhat is 'illbtle and resilient enough not to let itself be
blinded by the mere illusion of emancipation.
I Immanuel K;IIII. "\\'11;11 h Enli~hlenll\ent~" in Kalil" PoIiticl/l WH·li" .....,. etlired hy
Hans "ci,s. lr.m,l.t1ed h~ H. B. "i,I~1 fClIl1hridJ.:c: C;lInbridl,;e linh'er,ilY Press.
1970). p. 51(
: Th('tHltn .\dunlo. \·,·:!rlltl·~ /Jut/rel/c,. Ir;Il"I.llCd hy E. R..\,hlon ("e'" York:
Se"hlll \'. IY,:~ I. p. :120.
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There is, however, a limit on this dialectic, and there is one
proposition that enlightenmenl cannot accept: "namely, the
thesis that enlightenment itself mystifies."3
For something on the order of a quarter of a century.
Jurgen Habermas has struggled to keep both his guard up
and his faith intact. From his earliest writings he has sought to
disabuse his contemporaries-Marxist and non-Marxist
alike-of a naive faith in the beneficence of scientific and
technical progress without falling prey to the temptation of
\'iewing enlightenment itself as deception. That he has had
few illusions about the difficulties involved in questioning
what has passed for progress without denying that enlighten-
ment has progressed is witnessed by the relentless self-criticism
and constant reformulation to which his arguments have been
subject. To write about him is to run the constant risk of
criticizing as inadequate-or worse still, accepting without
question-points which he has already abandoned. The safest
course may be to focus less on the individual arguments and
try instead to capture the general trajectory which his en-
lightened suspicion about enlightenment has traced.
A Philosophy of History with a Practical Intent
We can take, as our point of departure, his point of depar-
tu reo In 1957, th ree years after receiving his doctorate for a
dissertation on Schelling's philosophy of history, Habermas
published an extensive survey in Philosophische Rundschau of
literature on "the philosophical discussion of Marx and Mar:x-
ism." The review, which focused on the difficulties Marx's
more recent commentators had had in coming to terms with
the perspectives opened by the publication of Marx's early
writings and the problems created by the political and
ideological reality of Soviet Marxism, came to some rather
3 Jurg~n Hab~rmas, "Consciousness· Raising or R~d~mptiv~ Criticism-Th~ Con-
l~mporaneit)' of Walt~r B~njamin," translated br P. Brewster and C. H. Buchner. NroJ
Cn-mnn Critiqut, no. 17 (Spring 1979): 56.
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unorthodox conclusions. The philosophical reading of Marx
had stumbled, Habermas argued, by assuming that \t(arx was
in any conventional sense the author of a philosophy. Against
the legions of Thomists, existentialists, fundamental on-
tologists, and philosophical anthropologists who felt that in the
Economic and Philosophical ,Hanuscripts one could find that
philosophy which grounded the rest of Marx's writings,
Habermas argued that Marx had to be understood first and
foremost as a social theorist who had sought to "abolish
philosophy" by "realizing" it." In understanding the unique-
ness of Marx's project, Maurice Merleau-Ponty had come
closest to the mark. Marx's abolition of philosophy created a
philosophy of history which was "no longer philosophical" in
that it no longer rested on metaphysical guarantees. Rather,
Marx's reading of history was a "critical prologue to praxis." It
was, in Habermas's formulation, "a philosophy of history
with a practical intent."5
There were, of course, others who had argued similar
points before Habermas. In the 1920s Karl Korsch and Georg
Lukacs had probed the peculiar relationship between Marxism
and philosophy, and the tension between philosophy and so-
cial theory had proved enormously provocative for the work
of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Mar-
cuse. 6 But against Lukacs explicitly, and implicitly against the
• Jiirgen Habermas, "Literaturbericht zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx
und der ~larxismus," in Ha~rmas. Th~ri~ und PTa:ru (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971),
pp. 401-403.
) Ibid., pp. 425-428.
• Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philo~ophy. translated by F. Halliday (New York:
Monthly Re\'iew Pres>. 1970): Georg Lukacs. His/ory and Class Cornciou.m~u, translated
by R. Livingston (Cambridge: \.fIT Press. 1971); :\lax Horkheimer, Anfting~ dn-
bUrg"lich"l G~."hicht,philo\oph~ (Stuttgart: Kohlhamrner, 1930); ~fax Horkheimer.
M~laterialism and \1etaphysics," in Horkheimer. Critical TMOry, translaled bv M. J.
O'Connell (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972). pp. 1~46: Max Horkheimer, "~1a.
lerialismus und \foral," in Horkheimer. Kri/i,ch~ Th~ori~, edited by Alfred Schmidt, 2
vols. (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1%8), I: 71-109: \fax Horkheimer, "Traditional and Cril-
ical Theory," in Horkheimer. Criticul Th~ory, pp. 188-253: Theodor Adorno, "The
Actuality of Philosoph v," Iranslaled by B. Snow, Telos, no. 31 (Spring 1977): 12~ 122:
Herbert \farcuse, "Philosophv and Crilical Theory," in \larcuse, .vega/iorLI, tr.mslated
by J. Shapiru (Roslon: Beacon. 196RJ. pp. 134-158.
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first generation of critical theorists-who, as Hahermas later
recalled, had by the mid-'fifties settled into a routinized cri-
tique of a rigidly stilndardized corpll5 of philosophical and
sociological texts7-Habermas sounded a new theme. The ar-
ticulation of this philosophy of history ",ith practical intentions
could no longer presume the \'alidity of Mal-x's categories or
anal\'ses. It must admit that the contemporary world provided,
if not a refutation of Marx's project, then at least some trou-
bling "facts against Marx."8 In plac~ of Lukacs's retreat to the
level of "objective possibility"-a strategy which left ~-1arx's
conjeclU res intact as potential consequences of a crisis which
for some reason never matured-Habermas called for a con-
frontation between the critical intentions of ~farx's philosophy
of history and the empirical analyses which contemporary
social sciences offered. s
Since that early review essay Habermas has forced critical
social theory into a confrontation with contemporary
philosophy and social science in hopes of revitalizing the prac-
tical intent of ~",farx's "dialectical theory of progress" without
losing sight of the critique of the illusions of enlightenment
which was the ultimate achievement of Horkheimer and
Adorno. tO His four books-Struktunuandel der Offentlichkeit
(1962), Erkenntnis und Interesse (1969), Legitimationsp1'obleme im
Spiitlwpitalismus (1973), and The01ie der kommunikativen Handelns
(l981)II-his numerous essays and essay collections,12 his de-
r Axel Honneth, Eberhard Knodler-Bunte, and Arno Widmann, "The Dialectics of
Ralionalization: An Interview with jurgen Habermas," Ttlos, no. 49 (Fall 1981): 6- i.
• jurgen Hahermas, "Between Philosophy and Science: ~farxism and Critique," in
Habermas. Tlltor; and Practiu, translated by j. Viertal (Boslon: Beacon, 1973), pp.
195-198. The first German edition carried the subtitle "Four Facts Against ~farx" at
the head of this section. !l was dropped in subsequent German editions and in the
English translation. .
• Habermas, ThtorU und PrfLru, p. 444.•
'0 \fax Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialtctic of Ell/ighttnmtnt, translated by j.
Cumming (:-.lew York: Herder & Herder, 1972).
II jurgen Haherma~,Stmltturwandtl tkr ()ff~ntlichlttit (:-':e~wied: Luchter-hand, 1962);
jiirgen Hahermas, KlIow/~dg~ and Human lnttrtsts, tran~lated by j. Shapiro (Boslon:
Beacon, 1971): jurgen Habermas, ugitimillion Crisis, translated by Thoma~ \fcCartby
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bates with practitioners of critical rationalism, systems theory,
and hermeneutics '3 have pursued two general complexes of
problems, seeking (1) to clarify the nature of the early capitalist
public sphere, to account for its transformation in advanced
capitalist societies. and to outline the potential problems this
transformation poses for the modern state and (2) to explore,
through a recourse to philosophical traditions outside the nor-
mal locus of discussion in Marxism and critical theory, that
peculiar relationship between social analysis and social criticism
that defines critical theory. Habermas's efforts have resulted in
the growth of a literature by and about him that already
threatens to defy cataloguing, let alone study,14 while Haber-
mas's own stature has grown to the point where he is in all
probability the most influential German social theorist since
Max Weber.
The task here, however, is not that of documenting his
influence so much as it is that of explaining his importance.
The major theme has already been introduced: Habermas's
claim on our attention rests with his peculiar coupling of a
commitment to a vision of history as at least potentially a
progress of enlightenment with a refusal to underestimate the
degree to which recent history has made a mockery of the
(BOSlon: Beacon. 1975); Jurgen Habermas. Thtorit dt5 kommuniknlivtn Hamu/TIS, 2 vols.
(Frankfurt: Suhrk'lI11p. 1981).
12 Th~ most imponilnl for Ihi, e".ly are: Hahermas, TI"'ori~ ""'/ Pmxi". partially
Iran,laled as Tluor)" '"u/ Pmel'{t: Ji,r!-{cn Habel"lllas. KIIIIII" IIlId Krilik (Frankfurt:
Suhrk'lIl1p. 197:\): ano Jiiq.:~n Hah~l"Ina,. ZIt,. H,kowtnlkllOn dt, hi"tori,eht" .\f{/t~·
"/IIh,mll' IFr'IlIHurt: Suhrk.lInp, (976). panially Iranslated Iw Thomas \IcCanhy as
COrnrnll/l/W/lOII fIIlff (I", £t'O/II(II1" 0/ Suo<'/y (1\0"011: Beacoll. 1979).
. " Th~odor :\dorno C[ al.. The Po.,ili,·',( DL'J}//It ill (;tl"l(/(/II SoelO/ug:•• Irim,laled hI' C.
\dc\' ,Ind 0, hi,b\' (l.ondon: Hein~m.llln, 19761: Karl-OlIO :\pel ct al.. Htnn,ntlllik
II/Id Idrol"""lmltk (Frilllkfun: Suhrkillnp. 1971l; jiir~en H"llerlO'.' ,md "ikla~
1.1I hmillln. Th,orit d,,. (;",/I,rha/I m/,,. Sf):/fI/ft'rhu()logit (F rankful'l: Suhd"lInp. 1971).
" The Ill'''' cOllIprehcn,i\'c an.d\"j, of hi, I,'ork is ThCllnas \ IcC.. rl hI', Tht enlleal
Theory IJj Jino.:~u f!"J,,,-mw (ClIllhridge: \IIT Press. 197H): thc paperhi.lck edition
(19~ II i.dd, .111 cXlen,ile hihlio!-{raphl' of H .• hermas's writing, cOlllpilcd Il\' Rcnc
(;on7t:n ,llld Frt·dnick \'an (;ddel, For .1 hihliograph\' of \\'rilin!(, on H .•hennas. see
jalllc, (;olliding, SU',IIt Klill~. ,lOd Can "Jcderman. "jiirgen H;lh~rlll,": ,-\n Imern •• -
.iollal lIihli"t.:ri.ph~:' P"lilirlJl Th"o,,,; i! (\1.'1' 19XO): 259-2H5.
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Enlightenment's hopes. This tension can best be grasped if we
examine in turn (I) Habermas's efforts to clarify the intentions
which define critical social theory, (2) his attempts to articulate
the distinctive features of the interpretation of history central
to this program, and (3) his recourse to the unique relation-
ship between language and action as a means of grounding his
hopes for enlightenment.
Pmcticallntentions
In the tradition of "practical philosophy" which Habermas
sees stretching from Aristotle to the rise of historicism in the
early nineteenth century, politics was viewed as a continuation
of ethics. concerned with the cultivation and formation of a
habit of virtue. and striving for a type of knowledge which was
categorically different from that of theoretical sciences. While
these latter disciplines sought certain knowledge (episteme)
through the contemplation of objects which did not change,
practical philosophy faced a domain of objects which could
always be different than they were. Its goal, accordingly, was
phronesis-a term which Habermas glosses as "a prudent
understanding of the situation."u
Habermas refuses to view the breakup of practical
philosophy and the consequent emergence of separate disci-
plines of politics, economics, ethics, and eventually sociology as
simply the progress of social theory "from lore to science."
Like the fragmentation of Marx's thought into separate do-
mains, it is a di",'ision which extracts a price: the gradual
erosion of the practical intentions which once served as a
coordinating reference. The crucial question, as Habermas
saw it in his 1961 Marburg inaugural lecture, went as follows:
... how can the promise of practical politics-namely, of pro-
viding practical orientation about what is right and just in a
.. Haherma~. "The Classical Doctrine or Policies in Relation 10 Social Philosoph)·... in
Hahermas. Thtor'5 finn Pmctia. p. 42.
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given siruation-be redeemed without relinquishing, on the one
hand, the rigor of scientific knowledge, which modern social
philosophy demands ...? And, on the other, how can the
promise of social philosophy, to furnish an analysis of the inter-
relationships of social life, be redeemed without relinquishing
the practical orientation of classical politics?16
Without denying that the more rigorous scrutiny which the
social sciences have brought to practical questions must be
regarded as a progress in enlightenment-and here Habermas
distances himself from more traditional proponents of the
classical understanding of politics such as Leo Strauss,
Wilhelm Hennis, Joachim Ritter, and Hannah Arendt-
Habermas is concerned with distinguishing this real progress
from the merely illusory enlightenment wrought by "scien-
tism": the view that science is not simply "one form of possible
knowledge" but rather the sole form in which knowledge is
possible. 17 In his analysis the "scientization of politics" takes
place on at least two levels: (1) on the level of theory as a
transformation of the various disciplines of practical politics
and (2) on the level of practice as a transformation in the
nature of political decision-making.
The Classical Doctrine oj Politics and iL5 Fate. Habermas has, on a
nu mber of occasions, analyzed the transformations which ac-
companied the emergence of the modern social sciences from
the corpus of classical practical philosophy.18 On the most
general level, the entire process can be understood as a re-
structuring of the relationship between the categories of praxis,
poesis, and theoria. In Aristotle's account, praxis-human action
oriented toward a goal-was distinguished on the one hand
from the contemplation of an unchanging cosmos (theoria) and
on the Other from the production of useful artifacts (poesis). A
good action (eupraxis) must be understood neither as some-
II 'bid., p. H,
.7 H.lhenll.", Knuu'l"ig~ find Hllmfln 'nln~III, p. 4.
,. H.I!lel'm>l', "Cla,sical Doctrine"; Jurgen Hahermas, "Kt'itische und kOllservari\'e
Aufgaben des SU/iologie," in Haberrnas. Th~o,.it lind Praxi.I, pp. 290-:i06.
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between the external world of natural processes, the internal
world of individual needs and desires, and the social world of
commonly shared values and norms. 2S These distinctions-
which Habermas embraces as the positive and undeniable
achievement of modernity-are threatened by the tendency,
also endemic to modern societies, to conceive all three worlds
in terms of the logic by which external nature has been mas-
tered.
Thus the reduction of praxis to poesis which Habermas ob-
served in the history of political and social thought is by no
means simply a theoretical category .mistake. To the extent
that decisions which would in principle require the informed
consent of citizens are posed as technical dilemmas which only
experts should address, the theoretical effacement of the dis-
tinction between praxis and poesis finds a concrete and practical
parallel. In his most recent discussion of the problem, Haber-
mas has argued that the evolution of capitalism has been
marked by a paradoxical and potentially crisis-ridden intru-
sion of technical and strategic modes of problem-solving-
fully appropriate, he argues, for addressing problems of
system-stabilization-into the life-world, a category which
Habermas no longer uses in the Husserlian sense but rather
reinterprets in terms associated with the tradition stemming
from Wilhelm von Humboldt's comparative cultural linguistics
as those general communicative competences which make
agreement possible. The life-world accomplishes such tasks as
the reproduction of cultural norms, the maintenance of social
integration, and the socialization of individuals, problems
which are by no means resolved by the solution of technical
problems of material reproduction. 26
Hence the progress of scientific and technological rationality
can, according to Habermas, lead to a paradoxical result:
%) Ihid., 1: 80-85, 125-126.
'·'hid., 2: 208-216: for earlier analyses, see jiirgen Habermas. Toward a Rational
Soci~,,·, translated by J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1970), pp. 50-122.
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Let's give our Marxist hearts a shock: capitalism was quite a
success, at least in the area of material reproduction, and it still
is. Granted it has indulged from the beginning in an enormous
plunder of traditional forms of life. But today the imperatives
built into the dynamics of capitalist growth can only be fulfilled
through a substantial growth in the-let us say-monetary-
bureaucratic complex. Therefore, we observe and feel and suf-
fer an "overspilI," an encroachment by the system on areas no
longer at all related to material reproduction.27
The consequence of this "overspill" is a "pathologizing of the
life-world"-an erosion of the medium of communicative in-
teraction through which the tasks of cultural reproduction,
social integration, and socialization are carried out and a con-
sequent proliferation of such pathologies as a loss of meaning
on the level of cultural reproduction, anomie on the level of
social integration, and individual psychopathology on the level
of socialization. Hence the great paradox of the transition to
modern forms of social organization: "the rationalized life-
world enables the rise and growth of subsystems whose auton-
omous imperatives self-destructively strike back at it."28
Sketched this quickly, it may be difficult to see what sets
Habermas's account of the self-destruction of enlightenment
apart from such earlier and perhaps better-known studies as
Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, Horkheimer's Eclipse of Rea-
son, or Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.
Habermas, however indebted he may be to his forerunners,
has nevertheless rightly insisted on some important dif-
ferences which set him apart from them. First of all, !vlarcuse,
Horkheimer, and Adorno, like Weber before them, assumed
that the culprit here was Western rationality as such and hence
were forced to concei\'e of any alternative as a break with
Western rationality as a whole. 2 !i Habermas, in contrast, has
2r Honneth et <.II., "Di<.llectics of IQtionalilation," pp. 21-22.
28 Habermas, Th,ol'it dt, Jco/1ll1lllniJCflIIt'tn Hrmdtln.,. 2: 277.
u Ibid., 2: 491. For more detailed criticisms of Adorno, see jiirgen Habermas,
"Urgeschichte del SlIhjecti\'itiil und \'ersildel'le Selbslhehallptung" and "Ein
philosophierender Illlellektut:ller," hoth in Hahermas, Philo,ophi.,cht-politi"ch, Profil'
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traced the m;daise to an antinomy within the progress of
modernity which could hc resolveo without abandoning those
achie\'ements of cnlightenmcnl which remain for Habermas
undeniable: the uncoupling and differentiation of 'various in-
stitlltional systems in the life-world such as culture. personal-
ity. ;lIld society: the introduction on all levels of a distinction
between form and content in the analysis of concepts, norms.
and principles: and the resulting institutionalization, in the
form of democratic means of political decision-making or the
"pedagogization" of education, of modes of reflection on the
symbolic reproduction of the life-world. 30
Second, Marcuse, HOJ'kheimer, and Adorno assumed that
this trill mph of scientific and technical rationality engendered
a seamless web of repression which foreclosed the possibility
of resistance by insuring itself against all potential crises.31
Hahennas, as has been seen. argues in contrast that the very
process of the scientization of the life-world is plagued by
serious contradictions and th reatened with potential crises.
This second difference is closely "elated to a third. The
earlier generation of critical theorists maintained a tacit or-
thodoxy in their assumption of the continued validity of the
analysis of reification developed by Marx in the discussion of
the fetishism of commodities in Volume 1 of Capital and
elaborated by Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness. They
were thus forced to keep looking for signs of revolt in those
classes which Marx had pinpointed. But Habermas has argued
that Marx cannot serve as an adequate basis for the critique of
the scientization of the life-world since he. in a crucial sense,
abets the process with his failure to develop a clear distinction
bet ween praxis and poesis.
(FI'.tnkfurt: Suhrkolmp, 19H1l. pp, 160-179: for ~Iarcu~e. see Jiirgen Habermas.
"Scic:nce .llld Tcchnolog} as Ideolob'1·... in Hahermas. TOWflrd a RatlOna/ Soon).. pp.
81- 122: am! for Horkheimer and Adorno. see Jurgen Habermas. "The Entanglement
of \fyth and Enlightenment: Remark~ on lhe Diu/fe/ic of Enligh/tnmtn/," .Vnv GtTman
Critiqllf. fOri hcoming.
:w Haherrnas. ThNlfir df\ kOl1llllllnikfltit'rll Hfllldfln.I, 2: 219-221.
"Il,id., I: -lA9- 5:{4 11·..ce, the de\'eJopment of (he "crilique of instrurnenlal rea~on"
from Lubc, [0 .\dorno .md Horl_heirner.
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Labor and Interaction. The distinction between labor and in-
teraction is of fundamental importance for Habermas's recon-
struction of Marx's philosophy of history with a practical in-
tent. The distinction, first introduced in a study of Hegel's
Jena Philosophy of Spirit and subsequently developed in an
analysis of Marx's conception of ideology critique. has been
subjected to extensive criticism and reformulation in the
years since its original appearance.32 It will not be possible to
examine here the degree to which Habermas's analyses of
Hegel and Marx stand up to critical scrutiny-although it
should be noted in passing that Habermas tends to have a
rather cavalier attitude toward what he terms "philological
questions" about the accuracy of his reconstructions of other
thinkers' arguments. 33 Rather, we must be content with
sketching the main contours of the initial distinction as devel-
oped in Knowledge and Human Interests before highlighting, in
the next section, some of the most crucial changes Habermas
has been forced to make.
As presented in Knowledge and Human Interests, the distinc-
tion can be read on at least three levels. 34 Taken on what
Habermas terms a "quasi-transcendental" level, it can be un-
derstood as a distinction between a technical cognitive interest
in the prediction and control of mute objects and a practical
cogn.itive interest in the maintenance of mutual understanding
n Jiirgen Habermas. "ubor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosoph, of
Mind," in Habermas, Th~ory and Practiu, pp.. 142-169 and Habermas, Knowl~dg~ and
Human Inln"~st.l. pp. 25-63. For a comprehensive collection of critical essays on the
(aller book, see Winfried Dallmayr. ed., Maurialim zu Habn7ruJs' Erkmntnis und Inln"-
m~ (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974). For critical discussions of the labor/interaction
distinction. see John Keane, "On Tools and unguage: Habermas on Work and
Interaction." .\'~ Gtnnan Critiqu~. no. 6 (Fall 1975): 82- 100; Axel Honnelh...Arbeil
und inslrumentales Handeln: Kategoriale Probleme einer kritischen
GcsellschaflStheorie," in A. Honneth and U. Jaeggi, eds., Arb~il, Handllmg, Normativitiit
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980). pp. 185-233; and Anthony Giddens, "Labour and
Interaclion," in Held and Thompson, Habn-rna.s: Critical D~bat~s.
JJ See the one.paragraph seltling of accounts in Jiirgen Habermas. "A Postscript 10
Knowl~dg~ find Human Inln"~st.l," translated by C. Lenhardt, Philosoph)' of tJJ~ Social
S=nw 3 (1973): 165-166.
34 For a more complete discussion of Ihe implications of the dislinction, see
McCarthy. TJu Critical Th~ory of Jurgm Habmnas, p. 23.
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between subjects capable of speech and action. On a method-
ologicallevel. it can be understood as a distinction between the
sciences which are guided by these respective interests: on the
one hand, empirical-analytic sciences which aim at an exten-
sion of technical control over nature and, on the other, her-
meneutic and cultural sciences which aim at an extension of
understanding between individuals and cultures. Finally, on a
sociological level, the distinction can be understood as an ana-
lytic device for noting, in empirical situations where both
categories will always be interwoven, the degree to which given
institutions serve to further the extension of technical control
or to further the maintenance of social integration.
Habermas's critique of Marx rests on a distinction between
Marx's actual empirical analyses and his theoretical under-
standing of their import. Habermas argues that while Marx's
empirical analyses comprehend the history of the species
"under categories of material activity and the critical abolition
of ideologies, of instrumental action and revolutionary prac-
tice, of labor and reflection," his theoretical reflections on his
own methods constantly deploy "the more restricted concep-
tion of the species' self-reflection through work alone. "35 The
consequences of the effacement in Marx's methodological
writings of the distinction between labor and interaction are at
least three-fold.36 First, and minimally, it leads Marx to con-
strue his critique of ideology along the lines of the natural
sciences, thus concealing the practical intentions of his
philosophy of history under the guise of a logic of technical
mastery. Second, it leads, in the discussion of automation
undertaken in the Grundrisse but not incorporated into Capital,
to a more serious misconception: Marx is tempted to view
emancipation from domination as a direct consequence of the
ever-increasing mastery of nature that capitalism promotes.
Third, it leads to the paradoxical resull that Marx is never able
n Habermas, Knowltdgt and HUTTUIn In/t'"tsU, p. 42; also pp. 52-53.
,. Ibid., pp. 44-60.
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to make good on his claim that struggles between classes con-
stitute the central dynamic of history since an analysis of
history as a dialectic of forces and relations of production
shows only how technical mastery of nature is extended. It
does not address the crucial issue of how actors come to
challenge the unequal distribution of the benefits which this
technical mastery produces.
The remedy Habermas proposes for these defects in Marx's
account is twofold. First, it will be necessary to reformulate
Marx's account of the self-constitution of the human species so
that the "history of industry" is not the sole "open book" from
which the development of the powers of the species is to be
read.37 The evolution of the species also takes place in norma-
tive dimensions such as law, religion, morality, and the evolu-
tion of world-views. Second, it will be necessary to focus more
closely on the peculiar status of ideology-critique: unlike the
knowledge which the natural sciences employ in the study and
mastery of a world of objects which are treated as separate
from the species, the knowledge gained from the critique of
ideologies turns back on the species itself. It represents a
process of practical enlightenment in which new insights react
upon the very process which is being studied. Both of these
aspects are crucial for Habermas's projected revitalization of
Marx's philosophy of history with a practical intent. Without
the distinction between labor and interaction, the dialectic of
progress loses its differentiated character and becomes either
a limitless optimism in the beneficent consequences of the
extension of science and technology or a boundless pessimism
in the face of a seamless web of technological domination.
Without the conception of ideology-critique as self-reflection,
the philosophy of history elaborated under the first aspect will
be devoid of practical intentions. The dilemma Habermas has
faced since Knowledge and Human Interests is that his elabora-
3: Karl \larx, Economic find Philo<ophic .\ltl/lu.<cripts of /844. in Robt:n C. Tucker, ed.,
Tht .HaTx-EII~tl< Rtnrltr (i':ew York: :-':onon, 19i8l. pp. 89-90.
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tion of the specific character of his reconstruction of historical
malerialism has foreclosed any simple view of the practical
intenl this history can be claimed to manifest.
Social Evolution
Criticisms of the conception of critical theory sketched in
Knowledge and. Human Interests have led Habermas to reformu-
late his view of the nature of critical theory and to conceive of
history in a way which differs markedly from the "philosophy
of history with a practical intent" which was his earlier proj-
ect. We shall first survey the revisions Habermas has made in
his understanding of historical materialism and then sketch
the basic arguments of his more recent theory of social evolu-
tion.
Revisions: A Reconstruction of the Evolution of Compelences. In
response to the criticisms directed at Knowledge and Human
Interests, Habermas has made at least three important revisions
in his project.38 First, he no longer sees critical social theory as
contributing to the self-reflection of a species which reproduces
itself through labor and interaction. Rather, critical theory is
concerned with the elaboration of systematic reconstructions of
social evolution. Second, this replacement of reflection by re-
construction is tied to a related shift of focus from the prog-
ress of a collective subject to the evolution of universal compe-
tences. Third, Habermas is now concerned "to free historical
materialism from the ballast of its philosophy of history"39 and
accordingly prefers to speak of an evolution of species compe-
tences rather than of a history of a species subject.
The shift from reflection to reconstruction was initially
motivated by critics of Knowledge and Human Interests who
38 See Habermas. "Postscript" and "Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt
to Link Theory and Praxis," in Habermas. Th~ory and PTQ£liu, pp. 1-40.
31 Habermas, Theone des lcornrnuniAativen Hand~/ns, 2: 562.
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argued that Habermas had given an overly idealistic account
of the way in which practical reflection shaped the develop-
ment of the species and further stressed that Habermas could
not employ the therapeutic situation in psychoanalysis-in
which the analyst frees the analysand from constraints by
aiding self-reflection-as a model for the relationship between
social criticism and its audience without introducing serious
distortions. 40 Granting much of this criticism, Habermas made
a distinction between reflection and reconstruction. arguing
that while "self-reflection brings to consciousness those deter-
minants of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual
formation (Bildung)" and thereby "embraces the particulars.
the specific course of self-formation of an individual subject,"
rational reconstructions deal instead with "anonymous rule
systems" and hence "do not encompass subjectivity." Self-
reflection leads to insights which are "rich in practical conse-
quences" by disclosing the pseudo-objectivity of habitual pat-
terns of behavior and thus making what was once unconscious
subject to conscious decision. Reconstructions, however, have
no such immediate practical consequences. They render ex-
plicit previously implicit sets of rules which govern a specific
competence but in so doing do not necessarily alter the way in
which an individual would perform such actions. 41
The most that Habermas is willing to claim for such recon-
structions is that by providing a general framework for critical
social theory they may serve reflection in a more mediated
fashion without engendering it. Reconstructive sciences such
as logic. linguistics, cognitive developmental psychology. psy-
choanalysis, and Habermas's proposed theory of social evolu-
tion are examples of a type of knowledge which should not be
40 Rudiger Bubner, "Was ist kritische Theorie?" in Apel et aI., H~tnnJtiJc und
ld~olo~~JcritiJc, pp. 204-206; Hans Joachim Giegel, "Reflexion und Emanzipation,"
ibid., pp. 278-282; and Hans·Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Her·
meneutical Rdlection," in Gadamer, PhilolOphical H~TmtnnJticJ, translated by G. B.
Hess and R. E. Palmer (Berkeley: Cniversity of California Press, 1976), pp. -I~42.
4. Habermas, "I ntroduction," pp. 22-23: also Habermas, "Postscript," pp. 182- 185.
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equated with empirical-analytic sciences-in the 19i 1 Post-
script to Knowledge and Human Inlerp.sts Habermas described
their status as that of " 'pure' knowledge," But one must also
be careful to set them apart from the more immediately prac-
tical concerns of hermeneutic sciences,42
The second re\'ision in Habermas's original project. the shift
from a focus on the historical formation of a universal species
subject to an analysis of the evolution of universal competf1ICPJ,
follows from the displacement of reflection by reconstruction.
In recent years Habermas has been concerned with a\'oiding a
danger he sees in the way Marx spoke of class consciousness.
class interest. and class action. Habermas has warned that such
expressions might lead one to suppose that ·attributes such as
consciousness. interest, and action can simply be transferred
from an individual to a collectivity.43 To avoid this, one must
not approach history as a unified process, bound together by
the accomplishments of a universal subject-as Lukacs did in
History' and Class Consciousness when he argued that the pro-
letariat was the "identical subject-object" that German idealism
had sought in \'ain in order to give coherence to world his-
tory. One must speak rather of the evolution of competences
which are universal in that their development can be traced
across a number of epochs (e.g" the evolution of legal
argumentation) but which cannot be viewed as the accom-
plishment of anyone subject or group of subjects. Thus while
"the self-producing subject of history was and is a fiction." it is
in no way meaningless to examine the evolution of sociocul-
tural systems in terms of their "politically consequential in-
stitutionalization of discourses."44
From this follows the third '·e\'ision. With the "practical
42 Haoermas. "POSl5cript," p. 184. For OJ more comprehensive discussion of these
sciences. see Jurgen Habermas. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Habermas. Com-
munication and Ihi Evolution of Soc~lJ. pp. ~20,
43 Jurgen Habermas. "Uber das Subjekt der Geschichte." in Habermas. Kultur und
Kritik. p. 398.
"Ibid.
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intent" of this reconstructed historical materialism already
placed in suspension, Habermas further questioned whether
ideology critique could any longer "draw upon the guiding
thread of philosophy of history."45 Reconstructions of the de-
velopment of competences are, in a strict sense, no longer
histories. They do not offer narrative accounts of the deeds of
identifiable persons and groups, nor do they record specific
events. Rather, they elucidate the development of a compe-
tence through a series of logically connected stages which need
not be traversed by any identifiable person or group. Evolu-
tionary explanations neither need nor permit translation into
that narrative form which is the hallmark of historical ac-
counts. 46
Consequences: A Differentiated Theory of Progress. These revisions
entail major changes in Haberrnas's earlier hopes for a revi-
talization of Marx's philosophy of history with a practical in-
tent. The proposed reconstruction of the evolution of compe-
tences is neither a philosophy of history nor is it animated by
practical intentions. However, Habermas is insistent that his
project remains a reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism
rather than its rejection.
Much in the reconstruction will be, of course, unacceptable
to more orthodox Marxists. As has been seen, Habermas to-
tally rejects the notion that historical materialism should con-
cern itself with the emergence of a collective subject somehow
representative of the interests of the species as a whole. He
also rejects the idea that the pattern of development traced by
historical materialism will be necessar.y, continuous, irreversi-
ble, and unilinear. H Transitions between one stage and an-
other are necessary only in the sense that if-for reasons
u Haberrna~. "Reply to \1v Crilic~:'
.. Jurgen f-Lthcrrn;ls. "Hi'lory and E\"olulion," lranslated by D. Parent, T,lol, no. :\9
(Spring 19791: JR, ·W.
• 1 JuriSen H"herm.ls. "Towarci a Reconstruction of Historical \1aterialisrn," in
H;lherma" COI/lIn'III;m(IOlt (/"'/ (It, Evolution of Sociny, pp. I"~ HI.
!
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which are contingent-there is a further development beyond
a given stage, it should take that form whose general character
can be sketched by the theory of social evolution. It is possible
for the theorist to construct certain, more advanced stages on
logical grounds alone-for example, Habermas's argu ment
that Kohlberg's stages of moral development, in order to at-
tain logical closure, demand the addition of one further
stage. ~8 It is not, however, possible for the theorist to specify
in an unequivocal fashion the subject or group of subjects that
could attain such competences or to indicate the empirical
preconditions which might lead to the attainment of such
competences. Further, the fact that progress has been made
does not prevent reversals frorri taking place; Habermas cites
the case of fascist Germany. Nor can one assume that evolu-
tion will be continuous-Habermas's theory could incorporate
cases of moral stagnation that would be the equivalent, in the
normative realm, of Marx's Asiatic mode of production. ~9 Fi-
nally, given the number of evolutionary units and the number
of discrete competences at stake, there is no reason to assume
that evolution will be unilinear. "Many paths," Habermas
writes, "can lead to the same level of development. ..."50
Thus Habermas's insistence that accounts of social evolution
must take into account the development of those "learning
processes ... that take place in the dimension of moral insight,
practical knowledge, communicative action, and the consen-
sual regulation of action conflicts" and which follow an "inter-
nal history" that cannot be reduced to the development of
productive forces breaks decisively with Marx's insistence that
law, religion, and morality have no history' save that caused by
their connection with the evolution of production.51 Never-
theless he insists that his account is both "historical" and "ma-
terialist." It is materialist insofar as he stresses that the crises
48 Jurgen Habermas, ~Moral Development and Ego Identity," ibid., p. 90.
.. lowe this analogy to a comment by Ken Baynes.
so Habermas, "Toward a Reconstruction," p. 141.
SI Karl \farx, Tht Gtnntln Itholog)', in Tucker. Tht Marx·Engtu RtadtT. pp. 154-155.
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which result from "unresolved, economically conditioned sys-
tem problems and ... the learning processes that are a re-
sponse to them" still remain the central dynamic of social
evolution. 52 Habermas assigns to normative structures a far
greater role than Marx did, arguing that they alone can re-
solve the crises which system problems produce and thus
function as the "pacemaker of social evolution." But the ever-
failing heart (if one may torture the metaphor further) re-
mains the economic base and Habermas is willing to grant that
"culture remains a superstructural phenomenon...."53
Thus Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism
culminates in a differentiated theory of progress which gives
no quarter to a boundless optimism in the progressive char-
acter of the extension of productive forces-since such unfet-
tered expansion of technical competences will lead only to
ever greater "pathologization of the life-world"-and yet pre-
serves a hope that on the level of normative structures a
progress in enlightenment is possible. To speak of an evolution
of normative structures, however, presupposes that it is possi-
ble, in spite of Habermas's modifications in the structure of
historical materialism, to share Marx's conviction that history
has an immanent teleology. "When we speak of evolution,"
Habermas argues, "we do in fact mean cumulative processes
that exhibit a direction. "54 To speak of a "dialectic of prog-
ress" is to argue that the stages of this evolutionary process can
be ranked according to some standard. The extension of
human mastery over nature-the unquestioned benchmark
which Marx took over from the Enlightenment-is by itself
not sufficient. Thus Habermas is forced to find a standard for
evolution in that domain which. with the progress of scientific
and technical rationality. has been increasingly abandoned to
relativism: the domain of moral development. To do this he
)2 Jlirge:n Habc:rmas. "Hislorical ~ale:rialism and lhe: Development of ~ormalive
Slructures," in Hah~rma,. Communicatiun and tht Evolution of SOCltty, pp. 97-98. Iii.
U Ibid.• p. 98.
.. Ha~rmas. "Toward .. R«onslruclion," p. 141.
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must find a presupposition which is "universal and
unavoidable-in this sense transcendental":;:; and yet which is
not necessarily fulfilled in practice and thus is capable of
sen'ing as a goal for action. Habermas's claim-perhaps his
most contro\'ersial one-is to have found such a presupposi-
tion through an analysis of communicative action.
Language and ,1.clioll
Hu man beings act and if questioned about their actions are
capable of giving reasons for them. When further questioned
about their responses. they are capable of discussing the rea-
sons they have given. It is on this obvious and at first glance
unexceptional fealure of social life that Habermas bases his
reconstruction of historical materialism. Speakers operate
under a "transcendental constraint"; to engage in discussion is
necessarily to make a series of commitments-the precise de-
tails of which may only gradually become clear-which are the
ultimate presuppositions on which any understanding is
grounded.56 As Habermas stated in his Frankfurt inaugural
lecture:
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of uni-
versal and unconstrained consensus. Taken together. autonomy
and responsibility constitute the only Idea we possess a priori in
the sense of the philosophical tradition. Perhaps that is why the
language of German Idealism. according to which "reason"
contains both will and consciousness as its elements. is not quite
obsolete. Reason also means the will to reason. 57
Speech is oriented toward an unconstrained consensus which
is never realized in any actual discussion. It thus furnishes
Habermas with a foundation which is simultaneously a goal, a
"Ibid., p. 177.
" Haberma~, "What I~ Universal Pragmalics?", p. 2.
.. Habermas, K'IOUJI,dgt and Humnn I II/tTt.lts , p. 314.
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standard against which the progress of enlightenment may be
measured which is both immanent and transcendent.
This ideal of an unconstrained consensus-or, as he has put
it more recently, the experience of an "undisturbed
intersubjectivity"-should not be understood solely in terms of
a community of speakers. Habermas has insisted that one
should approach this communications community "in the first
place as a community of interaction and not of argumentation.
as action and not discourse...."58 This ordering of emphasis
emerges clearly in Habermas's most recent work. Abandoning
an unwieldy manuscript which had taken its start from debates
in analytic philosophy, Habermas turned in his Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns to an analysis which takes its point of
departure from the problem of the rationalization of social
action. 59
Communicative Action. Habermas's account of communicative
action allows him to reformulate his earlier distinction be-
tween labor and interaction in a way which is both more
precise and more forceful. A reconstruction of the com-
municative competence of social actors allows Habermas to
distinguish. on the one hand, between "action oriented toward
success" and "action oriented toward understanding" and, on
the other, between the social and nonsocial situations which
action addresses. Thus within "action oriented toward success"
Habermas distinguishes between nonsocial instrumental action
and socially situated strategic action, while his category of
"action oriented toward understanding" can take place only
within social settings as "communicative action."60 Since he is
now dealing with competences which actors employ rather
than a distinction made on the level of "quasi-transcen-
dental interests," Habermas is able to make a much stronger
claim about the status of these distinctions:
•• H.'''~''I1'''. I "glllm.,IlOll Crt-h. p. 159. II. 16.
•• H;ah~rrn.h. T"~ulu ,J,., Rllmm'lIIik",it'n, H,/111I,.(IIJ. I: i-8.
'0 Ifll.(. 1: :SR-I- :11'17.
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I ;lm in fact supposing that the actors themselves, in every phase
of interaction, can know-however vaguely and intuitively-
whether they are adopting a strategic-objectivating attitude
towards other participants or are oriented to consenSllS....
subjectively the two basic attitudes that discriminate between
action oriented to success and action oriented to understanding
can by no means be understood only as different analytic aspects
of the same behavior.61
Subjects may, at times, be mistaken about their true motives,
and it is possible to have "systematically distorted communica-
tion" in the form of a concealed strategic action in which the
deception involved is unknown to both participants.62 But the
distinction is something more than a theoretical artifice: it is a
distinction which any competent actor may be expected to
invoke.
Further distinctions can be made within the sphere of com-
municative action itself. Speakers find, already embedded in
the conventions of the life-world, distinctions between external
nature, society, and internal nature. 63 Language has the ca-
pacity to articulate and relate these worlds in ways which
respect their differences. Thus competent speakers should be
able to take up different attitudes and assess the different
claims made within these different attitudes. In communica-
tion concerning external nature, speakers take up an "objec-
tivating attitude" and claim to offer a true representation of
the facts. With respect to society, speakers take up an "inter-
active attitude" and claim to judge the rightness of rules gov-
erning relations between individuals. Finally, with regard to
internal nature, individuals take up an "expressive attitude"
and claim to give a truthful disclosure of their needs and
desires. Speakers also have recourse to modes of argumenta-
tion for each of these domains which follow patterns of pro-
gressive radicalization differing from case to case. Finally,
overarching all of these forms of communication is the possi-
., Haber-mas. "Reply to My Critics."
6% Habermas, TheorU des kommuniAativen Handelns, 1: 442-446.
63 Ibid., 1: 125-126.2: 191.
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bility of an even more general discussion concerning language
itself which is devoted to clarifying the claims speakers make
with regard to any of the three levels under discussion. 54
The degree to which these potentialities of communication
have been elaborated gives Habermas a standard which may
be used to judge the level of rationality achieved in different
societies. After a discussion of the differences between mod-
ern and mythical world-views. Habermas argues that the claim
which modernity may make to possessing a greater potential
for rationality than traditional societies is grounded not on the
difference between their respective technical achievements but
rather: (1) on the degree to which modern societies have been
able to sustain a differentiation of object domains, validity
claims, and communicative attitudes; (2) on the degree to
which speakers in these societies are able to take up a critical
and reflexive attitude toward the society in which they live and
the claims which they make: (3) on the degree to which spe-
cific modes of argument have been clarified and subjected to
differentiated learning process; and (4) on the degree to
which the life-world has been uncoupled from systems of
purposive-rational action to allow for a more critical scrutiny
and fu rther interpretation of the claims made within com-
municative action. 5s
The Thorn of Modernity and the Diffzculties of Enlightenment. At
tbe heart of Habermas's defense of enlightenment, then, is an
argument that the differentiation of theoretical, practical, and
aesthetic discourses is the peculiar "signature and thorn of
modernity."66 In a recent interview he stated, "... I want to
keep the sense of discourse alive in a situation which objec-
tively forces one not to mix questions of truth with questions
of justice or taste." And then, reflecting on what he had just
e. Haberrnas. "What 15 Universal PraRmatics?", pp. 65-68.
e~ Hahermas. Thtorit dis irommuniltativtn Hnndtlns, 1: lOS- 113.
U Honnelh et al.. "Dialectics of Rationalization," p. 29.
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said, Habermas made it clear that these distinctions require no
small effort to sustain them:
This is expressed in an obstinate Kantian manner; but I have
accustomed myself (Q this neo-Kantian jargon in the last ten
vears, and I am somehow relieved that I can say it ~o casually. I
have never dared to say it in this manner-"this bureaucratic
depart mentalization of aspects of reason," Adorno would have
said.6 '
In order to take up the cross of modernity, Hahermas has had
to distance himself from the entire modus operandi of the
Frankfun School's critique of enlightenment.
There have been well-posed objections from even Haber-
mas's most sympathetic critics, objections which he has been
able to answer only by taming that Kantian obstinancy, which,
after all. is hut one of the roles he has managed to master.
Thomas \.1cCarthy has questioned whether we could learn
from traditional cultures how we might "put our fragmented
world back together again" and whether it might be possible to
engage in a dialogue in which both modern and traditional
societies would be participants in a common project of mutual
enlightenmen1.68 In response, Habermas has stressed that the
point of his theory of rationality is not to facilitate that separa-
tion of "us" from "them" which is the fatal hubris of en-
lightenment. Rather, the point is to "become aware of what
we, in the course of our learning process, have forgonen."69
Habermas's counsel is neither a Weberian acceptance of the
fate modernity has prepared for us nor a rejection of modern-
ity in the name of a lost golden age. The challenge is rather
to find ways-ways which speech alone makes possible--of
bringing about "a reconciliation of the decayed parts of mod-
ernity."10
61 Ibid.
•• Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality and Rdativism: Habcrmas' 'Overcoming' of
Hermeneulics," in Held and Thompson, HalNrma.s: Critical D~bakJ.
n Habermas, Th~ori~ d~5 kommunikativtn Hnnd~In5. 2: 588.
:. Honnelh el aI., "Dialectics of R;lIionalizalion," p. 28.
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Habermas is aware that this reconciliation has neither a
guarantee of success nor even a clearly defined group of
agents who might make the reconciliation in practice which no
theor}' can assure. Seyla Benhabib has noted an antinomy in
Habermas's recent work which parallels certain aspects of the
argument of the second part of this essay. The more Haber-
mas turns toward a theory of modernity elaborated in terms of
an evolutionary theory of discursive rationality, she argues,
the furrher removed does the prospect of an emancipated soci-
ety appear. for a counter-factually conceived structure of discur-
sive rationality articulates an emancipatory idea that cannot
guide emancipatory praxis. since it belongs to the concrete life-
history of no social subjects. but to the evolutionary potentia) of
the species in general. 7\
Habermas has tried, in the concluding section of his most
recent book. to make such a connection with new social
movements which could, with effort. be viewed as reacting to
the technification of the life-world which he has analyzed. 72
This may be asking too much of a reconstruction of the evolu-
tion of species competences with few illusions about its lack of
practical intents. The attempt to interpret social movements in
light of an evolutionary theory always runs the risk of falling
into that peculiar ventriloquism in which the theorist construes
certain silences in political and social movements as signs of
what has been silenced and-in the name of "emancipatory
praxis"-attempts to lend these movements a voice. Emanci-
pation, if it is not to become such a mystifying trick, may have
to coment itself with the more modest task of sketching out
what potentialities lie open, regardless of what agents mayor
may not be on hand.
Finally, in the face of Habermas's rather sweeping state-
ments about where language is headed. more skeptical readers
"Seyla Benhahih. "~lodernily and Ihe .\porias 01' Crirical TheMY." T~/o.•• nn. -19
(Fall 1981): 54.
12 Habermas. Th,ori, ti,. Jrommullikt!llt,~" Htlfld,/rl>, 2: 57~ 5H:1.
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might question whether manipulation, distortion, and am-
biguity can he so easily segregated off from communicative
action as Habermas's dichotomy of communicative and
strategic Clction suggests. Against Walter Benjamin's statement
that "there is a sphere of human agreement that is non-violent
to the extent that it is wholly inaccessible to violence: the true
sphere of 'mutual understanding,' language,"73 we might do
well to invoke Benjamin's other dictum:
... pessismism all along the line. Absolutely. Mistrust in the fate
of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate
of European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconcili-
ation: between classes, between nations, between individuals.
And unlimited trust only in I.G. Farben and the peaceful per-
fection of the air force. 74
But this objection is not an unfamiar one for Habermas, It was
his essay on Walter Benjamin, and not this essay on him, which
brought those two quotations together and fused them into a
monad which announces both the promise and the limitations
of a theory of communicative competence. 7S Perhaps it is well
that Habermas has not cultivated the advised mistrust in rec-
onciliation too vigorously. There is no shortage of critics of
enlightenment today. But there are few left to state its case as
forcefully or carefully as he,
73 Waller Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in Benjamin. R4J,Lctions. translated by
Edmund jephcoll (New York: Harcoun Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 289.
,. Waller Benjamin, "Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European In-
telligentsia," ibid.. p. 191.
7$ Habermas. "Consciousness·Raising or Redemptive Criticism," p. 59.
